THIS STUDY explores the relationships between state policies, including state mandates and state aid allocations, and the distribution of educational opportunities. Specifically, we analyzed the availability of and participation rates in programs for gifted and talented students using data from the Common Core of Data 1993-94 and the Schools and Staffing Survey 1993-94 .
Equal educational opportunity is a frequently expressed goal of modern education policy in the United States. To date, state legislatures retain primary responsibility for operationalizing definitions of equal educational opportunity and designing policies to promote it.
1 Within the broader framework of equal opportunity, state school finance policies are typically designed to promote combinations of one or more of the following goals:
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(1) Horizontal equity, or the equal treatment of equals. For example, insuring that education revenues per pupil are comparable across school districts of similar types, serving students with similar needs;
(2) Fiscal neutrality, or the absence of a systematic relationship between resources or opportunities and local district fiscal capacity; or (3) Vertical equity, or the unequal treatment of unequals. For example, insuring that students with different needs, and different costs associated with those needs, are able to access adequately differentiated opportunities.
State aid programs for public schools have historically emphasized horizontal equity and fiscal neutrality of dollar inputs to schooling across dis-tricts. That is, general state aid programs typically attempt to equalize per pupil revenue levels across districts of varied local fiscal capacity. Supplemental state aid programs, like aid for gifted education, attempt to achieve vertical equity for children with different educational needs and different costs associated with meeting those needs. Ideally, supplemental aid programs achieve a combination of horizontally equitable distributions of vertically equitable opportunities. The state's role is to provide sufficient, appropriately distributed aid such that districts have comparable ability to meet the varied needs of their student populations.
The new emphasis on educational adequacy may clear up some of the confusion created when attempting to integrate concepts of horizontal and vertical equity. Educational adequacy focuses on identifying the resources necessary to (a) provide a given, adequate, set of educational services 2 -input based adequacy, or (b) produce a given set of student outcomes-outcome based adequacy. In the former case, each child has a specific set of educational needs, requiring different sets of educational services, which have different costs. As such, each child has his or her own "adequate" education. In the latter case, econometric cost function research has similarly shown that different costs are associated with achieving similar outcomes across different students, under different circumstances (Duncombe & Yinger, 1999; Reschovsky & Imazeki, 2001) . 3 Baker (2001a) developed a framework for evaluating supplemental aid allocations and applied the framework using national data from school year 1995-96 on aid for limited English proficient, at risk and gifted education programs. The framework involved three components: (a) Adequacy, defined as aid being allocated at levels sufficient to meet the marginal costs 4 of providing adequate services; (b) Rationality, defined as aid being allocated at higher levels to districts predicted to have higher need 5 and (c) Equity, defined as aid being allocated in higher amounts to districts with lower fiscal capacity. Baker found adequacy particularly difficult to evaluate in the absence of consistent, precise empirical evidence regarding program costs. Baker found that supplemental aid was allocated "equitably" in slightly over half of reporting states for compensatory education, even though identification of at risk students is often contingent on income status. Finally, Baker found that supplemental aid was allocated "rationally" in Baker and Friedman-Nimz 40 less than half of states reporting aid for limited English proficient students.
We extend this framework in an attempt to define relationships between policies, including aid allocation, and distributions of opportunities for gifted children. State aid may be allocated neutrally, progressively or regressively with respect to local economic indicators ranging from district fiscal capacity, to family income and poverty levels. Neutral allocations are those that vary randomly with respect to local fiscal capacity or economic status. Progressive allocations are those where higher levels of aid are allocated to districts with lower fiscal capacity or economic status, and regressive allocations are those where higher levels of aid are allocated to districts with higher fiscal capacity or economic status.
Similarly, opportunities may be distributed neutrally, progressively or regressively with respect to local economic indicators. Linking policies and opportunities, we assume that progressively distributed aid is more likely to lead to more neutral distribution of opportunities (Figure 1) , and that flat, or regressive distribution of aid is more likely to lead to regressive distribution of opportunities ( Figure 2 ). We caution, however, that perfectly neutral distributions of opportunities may not accurately reflect differences in need. For example, it may be reasonable to believe that more gifted and talented students attend school in higher income neighborhoods. This may occur because lower income parents of gifted children are more likely than lower income parents of other children to exercise residential mobility, moving to higher income districts with more opportunities for their children. Similar patterns might exist where inter district choice programs are available.
Objectives
The analyses that follow characterize the distribution of aid and opportunities for gifted children across schools and districts nationally. We test a series of hypotheses regarding the influence of program mandates and alternative funding policies on the distribution of state aid, and program mandates and state aid on the distribution of opportunities, with particular attention to the neutrality of aid and opportunities with respect to income. More precisely, are state funding and programming opportunities generally allocated progressively, neutrally or regressively with respect to percentages of low-income students in schools or districts? Our two major research objectives were as follows:
1. To characterize state aid allocations to local districts for providing services to gifted and talented children, with particular emphasis on state policies and the allocation of aid with respect to district socio-economic characteristics.
2. To characterize the distribution of programming opportunities for gifted children across schools across states with respect to school structural characteristics, district financial characteristics, and with particular emphasis on school socioeconomic characteristics and state policies.
Specific research questions under the first objective included: (a) Is there a relationship between state policies, such as whether the state mandates that districts provide programs for gifted children, the type of supplemental aid formula used by the 41 state, and the level of aid provided to local districts? That is, do states with mandates tend to provide more or less aid to local districts and do states using particular approaches to funding tend to provide more or less aid? (b) How is aid allocated with respect to the percentage of children in districts that are low-income? (c) Does the presence of a mandate, or type of funding formula affect the distribution of aid with respect to socio-economic status? This final question is most important for addressing how we might modify state policies toward providing greater opportunities for lowincome gifted children.
Specific research questions under the second major research objective included: (a) What are the major district and school level determinants of whether schools offer gifted and talented programs, and of numbers of students participating in those programs? (b) In particular, how are pro- gramming opportunities and participation rates distributed with respect to numbers of low-income students? (c) Do state regulatory and funding policies influence the numbers of schools providing programs and numbers of students participating in those programs? (d) Does the availability or level of state aid change the nature of within state relationships between opportunities and socio-economic status?
With respect to question (c) one might hypothesize, for example, that in many states, programming opportunities and participation rates will be much higher in schools serving fewer low-income students, or opportunities will not be socio-economically neutral. With respect to question (d) one might hypothesize that increased levels of state aid should be associated with weaker relationships between numbers of low-income students and opportunities. Ideally, increased aid should help to socio-economically neutralize opportunities. This does not mean necessarily that states providing aid, or states providing the most aid will possess no statistically significant relationship between percentages of low income students and program availability or participation rates, but rather, that states providing aid, or higher levels of aid should display weaker (less negative) relationships.
The macro-level statistical analyses presented herein shed light only on the aggregate distribution of aid and opportunities across states, providing little substantive insight into interactions between state regulatory and funding policies and local opportunities, and other more subtle issues regarding within state distributions of opportunities. As such, we follow-up our cross-state analyses with an in-depth discussion of two states, South Carolina and Virginia, which present striking contrasts in state policies and district level finances and school level opportunities.
Related Literature
A handful of studies address fiscal and human resource equity and adequacy issues related to gifted education (Baker, 2001b (Baker, & 2001c Baker, 1995; Baker & Richards, 1998; Curley, 1991) . Baker and Richards, for example, chronicle the decline of gifted programs in Northeastern states (Connecticut, New Jersey, and New York) in the late 1980s and early 1990s at the hands of those who perceived such programming to be elitist (discussed by Renzulli & Reis, 1991) . The irony Baker and Friedman-Nimz 
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of Baker and Richards' findings is that the reduction of publicly funded elitist programming (i.e., programming made available to a small, apparently privileged group of students) was associated with the emergence and expansion of numerous fee-based private programs for gifted children. Curley (1991) studied the effect of New York State's gifted education funding program on resources available at the local level. At the time, New York State maintained a flat grant program ($196 per 3% enrollment) 6 intended to help all districts in the state provide at least some support for gifted children. Curley found, however, that New York State's flat grant per gifted child functioned primarily as a supplement to school districts with substantial local wealth, paradoxically stimulating increased inequities in services for gifted children rather than promoting equity.
Only one existing study explicitly links state policies for gifted education with the availability of programming opportunities. Purcell (1992 Purcell ( , 1995 performed an analysis of the availability and comprehensiveness of programming opportunities across 19 states, in relation to state policies (mandates) and economic conditions. Purcell found that programming was typically less comprehensive in states without mandates and in particular, in states labeled as having poor economic health and without mandates. Unfortunately, Purcell's study operationalized availability and comprehensiveness as perceptions of state directors of gifted education and local district administrators regarding comprehensiveness, rather than as quantifiable measures of available resources. In addition, Purcell's analysis provides no statistical estimates of the influence of specific policy features on program availability, or any information on where (school-based or private), or for whom (types of talent or identifiable student populations) programming opportunities were available in the 19 states investigated. Likewise, Passow and Rudnitski's (1993) analysis of states' gifted education policies resulted in the observation that "state funding of programs for the gifted, at whatever level, makes a positive statement and spurs local efforts" (1993, p. 76) . However, the specific effects of particular funding policies were not investigated.
In addition to the findings of Baker (2001b Baker ( & 2001c and Purcell (1992 Purcell ( , 1995 regarding specific programs for gifted students, a growing body of policy research indicates that in general, chal-lenging curricular opportunities including eighth grade algebra or other advanced academic courses are not evenly or randomly distributed by student or school characteristics. For instance, in a national analysis based on data from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) Trial State Assessment, Raudenbush, Fotiu and Cheong (1998) found that minority students and students whose parents had less formal education had significantly less access to eighth grade algebra programs. They also noted that the degree of social and ethnic inequality in access varied significantly across states (p. 253).
Consistent with Baker's findings on Texas school districts, Monk and Hussain (2000) , in a study on the determinants of the internal allocation of resources in New York State high schools, found greater property wealth to be associated with increased allocations into the advanced areas of mathematics and science. These findings suggest that state policies are not uniformly promoting neutral distribution of at least some types of opportunities, most notably, advanced or challenging curricular opportunities. A more detailed and comprehensive analysis is warranted.
Data
For our analyses to comprehensively and consistently link state policies and district level finances and school level opportunities, it was necessary to find a collection of data sets and sources of policy documentation covering all fifty states for a single school year. Gold, Smith and Lawton (1995) indicate that 40 states had policies for providing aid to local districts (See appendix A). One possible reason for the underreporting of revenues at the local level is that gifted education funds are often distributed through special education programs and not reported separately from other special education receipts by local districts.
For analyses of the association between policies, state aid allocations and opportunities, CCD data were merged with SASS data. The merged datasets included approximately 8,000 schools for which all relevant data were available, out of a total of 8,767 schools. SASS data were used to identify schools providing gifted and talented programs and to identify numbers of gifted and talented students served in programs. SASS data were also used to classify structural characteristics of schools that may influence program availability, such as the geographic location of the school, the grade levels of the school, whether the school was a magnet school or used competitive criteria for admission, and the numbers of low income students attending the school.
Prior analysis of the distribution of school-level opportunities for gifted and talented students have been performed with data from the National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 (NELS '88) (Baker & Friedman-Nimz, 2002) . While NELS '88 provides more comprehensive socioeconomic data on students, SASS had several advantages over NELS '88 for the analyses herein. First, SASS data were available for school year 1993-94, overlapping with both available policy documentation and CCD data on gifted education state aid allocations. Second, SASS includes data on both the availability of gifted and talented programs at the school level and the participation rates of students in those programs. Third, SASS, unlike NELS includes a randomly selected, state representative sample of schools. SASS data used in this study are from the School survey.
Several caveats are in order regarding the structure of the merged dataset and models estimated with the data. While the merged dataset included measures at three levels (state, district, school), two-level models were estimated in part to sim-plify interpretations. The majority of cases in the merged dataset involved only one school per district. The provision of gifted and talented services is predominantly a district, not school-level decision, creating within district dependencies between schools. Such dependencies may result from the possibility that larger districts may consolidate gifted children and their resources into special schools, leaving the majority of schools in the district with no program of their own, or that smaller districts in some states may opt for services provided through regional centers, creating the appearance of no in-district programs, or that districts will require all schools to provide special programming.
Modeling State Aid Allocations
The dependent variable in the state aid allocation model is the cost-adjusted, local districts' reported, state revenues per pupil for gifted education. This variable was constructed by first dividing state revenues for gifted education by total district enrollments, then dividing the aid per pupil by Chambers' geographic cost of education index. Cost adjustments were used in order to estimate the local purchasing power afforded by the state aid allocation. It is possible, for example, that larger percentages of low-income students attended inner city urban districts where resource prices were generally higher. As such, comparable or flat levels of unadjusted aid that may have been adequate outside of urban areas may not have been adequate within urban areas.
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The U.S. Census 1990-reported percentage of children living in poverty available in the CCD was the district-level socioeconomic status measure chosen for the aid allocation model. While other available measures, including district median family income may have provided a better picture of the distribution of aid across districts of all income levels, the poverty measure was chosen primarily for consistency with school level SASS measures used for evaluating opportunity distribution.
State policy independent variables included (a) whether the state possessed either a legislative or departmental regulatory mandate that local districts provide gifted programs and (b) the type of funding formula used for allocating aid to local districts. Funding formulas for allocating aid for gifted education fall into the following categories: Baker and Friedman-Nimz Pupil Weights: Under a weighted pupil-funding system, state supplemental aid is allocated on a per-student basis where the amount of aid is based on the funding weight associated with each student. For example, a gifted child might be weighted 1.12 (Texas), such that a district receives 12% additional aid (12% ! Base Aid Allocation per Pupil) per each gifted child identified. The perceived advantages of weighted aid include the ability to accommodate cost differences across districts by student need (e.g., districts with more students in need may access more funding) and the ability to attach the pupil weights directly to general fund aid allocations. That is, weights may be added directly to district general funds, giving district administrators flexibility on how funds are used. Further, weights attached to general funding are equalized for local district capacity to the same extent that general aid is equalized. One limitation of using weights for gifted education is that smaller districts may have too few students to generate useful levels of aid. Another is that when supplemental funds are added to general funds for "flexible" use, they may or may not end up benefiting the intended recipients. That is, there is no guarantee that funds brought in through pupil weights will actually be spent on gifted programs, unless specified in state accounting requirements. In 1993-94, seven states used pupil weights as the primary method for allocating aid for gifted education (See Appendix A).
Flat Grants: Flat-grant funding is based on a fixed funding amount per student, and may be allocated either per identified student, or per total student population, assuming fixed portions of special needs students across districts. In the latter case, flat grant funding is sometimes referred to as Census-Based funding. Where flat grants per identified pupil are capped at a specific percentage (New York state's $196 per 3% pupils), they are the equivalent of a census-based grant. For example, the NY flat grant of $196 per 3% pupils is the equivalent of $5.88 per total pupils. A perceived disadvantage of census-based approaches is that they fail to accommodate differences in need across districts (higher rates of giftedness in some districts than others). Flat grants, like pupil weights, also fail to provide sufficient aid to districts lacking critical mass. Further, flat grants, by definition are not equalized for local district capacity. In 1993-94, 13 states used flat grants as the primary method for allocating aid for gifted education (See Appendix A).
Resource Based: Resource-based funding is based on an allocation of specific education resources, usually teaching staff, but sometimes classroom units. One perceived advantage of this approach in special education is that it can accommodate varied resource needs across districts. In gifted education, however, resources (personnel or classroom units) are typically allocated on a census basis, like Virginia's funding program that allocates one gifted specialist per 1,000 enrolled pupils. A potential advantage of personnel-based funding in gifted education is that the approach does not necessarily dictate, or even imply the numbers or percentages of children that should be served by the personnel. A perceived disadvantage, however, is that aid allocated only for personnel reimbursement ignores resource costs beyond personnel (materials, supplies, equipment, transportation etc.). States may choose to share the cost of resources on a capacity equalized basis, as in Virginia, or to allocate resources in a manner more similar to a flat grant. In 1993-94, five states used resource based formulas as the primary method of allocating aid for gifted education (See Appendix A).
Percentage Equalization: Under a percentage reimbursement system, the amount of state supplemental aid a district receives is based on its prior year expenditures for the program. States generally reimburse only the percent of expenses the state can afford in a given year and states generally set guidelines as to which expenses are reimbursable. One perceived advantage of this approach is that reimbursements may accommodate significant cost differences across districts. Prior to 1992, Connecticut used a percentage reimbursement program that originally reimbursed gifted program expenses on a 30% to 70% sliding scale, which was subsequently reduced to a 15% to 30% sliding scale, based on district wealth, then eliminated in 1992. In 1993-94, six states used percentage reimbursement as the primary method for allocating aid for gifted education (See Appendix A).
Discretionary Grants: Discretionary grants are grants awarded to local districts by application to the state. Often, discretionary grants are awarded on a competitive basis. In 1993-94, nine states used discretionary grants as the primary method for allocating state aid for gifted education (See Appendix A).
The intent of the state aid model was to estimate the relationships between state policies, district-level income status and the level of aid received. Further, the intent was to discern whether different policies were associated with different relationships between district level income status and the level of aid received. For example, states
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with programming mandates might display more neutral (slope closer to 0), or even more strongly equalized (slope above 0) distributions of aid with respect to poverty, which we refer to as progressive distributions. That is, given the tenuous assumption that where mandates are not present, the tendency is for districts with more low-income students to identify fewer students as gifted and receive less aid from the state, creating a negative slope between percent low income and state aid, or a regressive distribution with respect to income status.
Funding formula types should have more direct and obvious relationships to aid distribution than program mandates. For example, it is highly unlikely that flat grant programs, in which wealthy and poor districts have access to the same level of aid per gifted pupil, would produce neutral or progressive aid distributions with respect to income status. Similarly, discretionary grant programs, unless they include stipulations regarding district financial need, are unlikely to produce neutral or progressive aid distributions. Pupil weights integrated with equalization formulas, and resource based and percentage equalization programs, which often account for local district fiscal capacity are more likely to produce neutral or progressive aid distributions.
Testing these hypotheses required multilevel modeling, where districts were the Level 1 units and states the Level 2 units. SAS PROC MIXED was used to estimate a two-level model of aid allocation, where the revenues of district "j" in state "k" were the dependent variable. The model may be specified as follows:
Where POL k represents the matrix of policy variables for each state "k," (POV jk " POV k ) represents the state mean 11 centered percent of children in poverty. The structure of the model is such that ␥ 01 and ␥ 10 test the across state relationship between state policies and the level of aid received by local districts and the within state relationship between percent poverty and aid levels respectively. The mean centered percent of children in poverty is also included as a random effect in the 
Modeling Opportunity Distributions
The intent of the opportunity models was to estimate the relationship between state policies, aid allocations, school-level income status and the availability of and participation rates in programs for gifted and talented students. Recent research by Baker and Friedman-Nimz (2002) provides insights into important school and district-level covariates of such opportunities that must be considered in the design of the statistical models. These covariates include, but are not limited to, school geographic location (urban, suburban, rural) and school and/or district size. Baker (2001b) also presents evidence that district level financial characteristics may influence program availability.
The two dependent variables in the models included a binary indicator of whether or not a school offered a gifted and talented program and a measure of the percent of students who participated in that program. Where the dependent variable was binary, logit estimation was used. The latter dependent variable, participation rates, was censored at both the upper and lower limits. That is, there were some schools in the sample in which no children participated in gifted programs (2,533) and some schools in which all children participated (39). Because the dependent variable was left and right censored, tobit estimation was used. For the logit and tobit analyses, a random effects specification which estimates the weighted average of the within state and between state relationships between the independent and dependent variables. Unfortunately, this specification assumes falsely that state level policy variables may vary randomly across districts. For this, and other reasons to be discussed in this section, linear mixed models were also estimated for the percent participation dependent variable.
The general model of opportunities may be specified:
Baker and Friedman-Nimz
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Where Y ijk refers either to the school level program availability or participation rate measure for school "i" in district "j" in state "k," POL k refers to the policies of state "k," POV ijk refers to the poverty measure "percent low income" 13 of school "i" in district "j" in state "k," and STR ijk refers to a matrix of school and district level characteristics assumed to independently influence program availability and participation rates.
The matrix of policy variables included (a) a binary indicator of whether the state had a legislative or regulatory mandate requiring that local school districts provide programming opportunities for gifted children, (b) a binary indicator of whether or not the state provided funding to local districts to support gifted programs and (c) a measure of the cost-adjusted aid per pupil for gifted education.
When modeling the influence of state supplemental aid on local decisions, like the decision to offer gifted programs, or to serve more or fewer students in those programs, aid allocations may be measured either of two ways. First, aid may be measured at the local district level in order to discern whether districts that receive higher levels of aid within states are more likely to provide programs or serve larger percentages of students in those programs. Aid received by local districts, however, is endogenous to local student need. That is, the amount of aid a local district receives in total or per pupil, is partly a function of the number of pupils in the district that require special programming. Concurrently, district officials may identify and serve more or fewer pupils in special programming based on the availability and level of aid. The only way to account for these effects is to have a good exogenous measure of the actual prevalence of need at the district level. Unfortunately, perfect information on the actual distribution of gifted children is unattainable.
Alternatively, aid may be viewed from a state policy perspective and measured as the average state aid allocation per pupil or per pupil in need. The average state aid measure should be relatively exogenous to local student need. That is, the average state commitment should be determined primarily by political preferences and budget constraints of state legislators. A possible exception to this assumption is that the state commitment may be influenced by the strength of state level lobbying groups for gifted education, which may be associated with prevalence of truly gifted children.
Nonetheless, for these models we choose average of the cost-adjusted gifted education aid per pupil, the more exogenous option, as our aid level measure.
Models included either the binary funding indicator or the funding level measure. Models using the binary funding variable were estimated because of the limited data available for generating reliable estimates of cost adjusted aid per pupil. Where the binary indicator was used, nearly 8,000 SASS schools across all states were included. Where the funding level variable based on CCD data is used, only 3,153 schools in 19 states were available for analysis. This sample was restricted to only those states where funding was available and the level of that funding could be estimated using district revenue data from the CCD.
The socioeconomic indicator for the opportunity models was the percent of children qualifying for National School Lunch Programs as reported in SASS. Unfortunately, unlike the U.S. Census poverty measure used at the district level in the state aid model, this low-income measure relies on the compliance behaviors of local school administrators and is likely to be much less reliable. We chose this measure over continuing to use the district measure, however, because it applied to the school level and we expected significant within district variation in school level income status.
District-level covariates included district enrollment (in thousands) and two measures of district resources, (a) cost adjusted current expenditures per pupil and (b) the percent of total revenues received from the state, a measure of state aid dependence. Cost adjusted current expenditures are included as a measure of a district's capacity to supplement state gifted education aid to meet local student needs.
14 It is assumed for example, that when gifted education aid is insufficient and/or when gifted education aid is not equalized for local fiscal capacity differences (flat grant), that districts with higher cost adjusted current expenditures will be more likely to offer programs and serve more students in those programs. In recent decades, however, some states have attempted to aggressively fund poor urban districts, such that their cost adjusted current expenditures may be equal to or higher than state averages. Our expectation is that these districts remain unlikely to offer gifted programs or serve large numbers of students. Our state aid dependence measure is included to account for these conditions.
15
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District-level indicators of the percent of students voluntarily entering or leaving a district through inter-district choice programs were also included. Our assumption is that schools in districts with higher levels of students entering the district are more likely to have gifted programs and likely to have higher percentages of students served in gifted programs. Simultaneously we expect that schools in districts where higher percentages of children are leaving the district may be less likely to provide gifted programs and may serve fewer students in those programs where they exist. We also included district-level measures of the percent of students participating in magnet programs and the percent of students participating in intra-district choice programs in general, on the assumption that increased intradistrict choice and increased magnet school enrollments might reduce the overall likelihood that individual schools in the district provide special programs or serve large numbers of students in those programs.
School-level covariates included indicators of whether the school was in an urban, suburban or rural area and whether the school was an elementary, secondary or comprehensive (K-12) school. Previous research indicates lower frequency of opportunities in urban areas, with some mixed findings regarding suburban and rural areas Friedman-Nimz, 2002, Baker, 2001b) . School level enrollment (in thousands) was also included on the expectation that larger schools are more likely to offer programs, but that they might serve smaller percentages of students in those programs. Two binary variables are included to identify schools that either offer a magnet program, or have admissions criteria other than enrollment areas. The former, magnet schools, frequently cater to high-ability children and those in the SASS dataset are no exception. The latter, schools with alternative admissions criteria include a mix of schools that serve high-ability and low-ability children and children with other special educational needs.
As noted previously, the primary intent of the opportunity models was to estimate the direct relationships between state policies, aid allocations, school-level income status and the availability of and participation rates in programs for gifted and talented students. Similar to our state aid models, our secondary questions involving the opportunity models include whether state mandates and fund-ing influence the neutrality of program participation rates in particular. For example, we might expect that in states with program mandates, that the relationship between school level income status and participation rates would become more neutral or less regressive. We might further expect that states providing funding, or higher levels of funding would have even more income neutral participation rates, unless, of course, aid was being allocated in a regressive manner.
As with the aid model, testing these assumptions requires multi-level modeling. The multilevel opportunity model may be represented as follows:
Where Y ijk refers to either program availability or participation rates in school "i" in district "j" in state "k," POL k refers to the policy variables for state "k," (POV ijk " POV k ) refers to the state mean centered percent low income for school "i" in district "j" in state "k," (RES jk " RES k ) refers to the state mean centered district level resource variables for district "j" in state "k," and (STR ijk " STR k ) refers to the state mean centered 16 schoollevel structural variables for school "i" in district "j" in state "k." Note that the state mean-centered poverty variable is interacted with the matrix of policy variables and is also included as a random effect [u 1j (POV ijk " POV k )], similar to the treatment of the poverty variable in the aid model. These steps are taken to allow the slopes between poverty and participation rates to vary randomly across states and to test whether mandates, funding availability or funding level influence the progressiveness, regressiveness or neutrality of these slopes.
A significant caveat for our opportunity models is that the school-level relationship between program availability or participation rates and percentages of low-income children is unfortunately not as straightforward as we might hope for conducting the hypothesis tests herein. For example, the presence of magnet schools for gifted children in large urban, predominantly low-income districts may reduce the apparent availability of gifted programs in neighborhood schools, yielding 0% participation rates for many neighborhood schools in districts with magnet programs and decreasing percentages of schools offering programs. Concentration of gifted children in magnet schools does not necessarily adversely affect neutrality of opportunities if low income gifted children have equal access to magnet schools, that is, if socioeconomic cream skimming does not occur in magnet school application, admissions or retention processes.
As mentioned earlier, low-income parents of gifted children might choose to live in higher income neighborhoods with schools having strong gifted programs, creating a neutral distribution of gifted children within higher income schools, but not across high-and low-income schools.
17 Such parental choices may simultaneously inflate numbers of gifted children in high-income districts and deflate numbers in low-income districts. Where the school is the unit of analysis, this may falsely inflate the perception that higher income students receive the majority of services. Of course, if such mobility were substantial, it would lead to higher percentages of low-income students in previously high-income schools, changing the income status of those schools. A possible problem relating to our specific measures occurs if the low-income child attending school in the higher income district is less likely to apply for participation in the National School Lunch Program. Where this occurs, our measures will overstate potential negative relationships between percent low-income and program participation rates.
Another potential concern is that the SASS measure of gifted program participation appeared to have different meanings in different schools. The measure is not necessarily a measure of students identified as "gifted and/or talented," but rather a measure of those students who received services from a school's gifted and talented program. Several schools in the SASS dataset that are not special schools for the gifted and talented claim 100% participation rates in their gifted programs. 18 One might speculate that at least some of these schools are providing "school-wide" enrichment services and claiming all students as participants regardless of the extent of their involvement, rather than identifying the subset of students who are the primary beneficiaries of such programming.
Findings
Estimates for the state aid distribution model are displayed in Table 1 . The aid distribution model revealed potentially interesting, but only marginally significant (p < .10) relationships. Separate models testing the effects of mandates, and each type of funding formula independently, revealed no statistically significant findings, calling into question the robustness of the first model with all state level covariates. With only 18 states at Level 2 of the model, the model is most likely over specified, but is discussed herein for illustrative purposes. The direct effect of the income variable in the first model suggests, though certainly not decisively, that aid was generally allocated by states in higher levels to districts with more low income students, or progressively.
The covariance parameters for all models in Table 1 indicate that (a) the level of aid allocated across states varied significantly and (b) that the slopes between aid and percent low income also varied significantly across states. Interestingly, though only marginally significant ( p < .10), the covariance between slopes and intercepts suggests that states that provided higher levels of aid allocated that aid more regressively.
None of the direct effects of the state policy variables on funding level were significant, perhaps due in part to the relatively small Level-2 sample size of only 18 states. Among the interaction terms there was some indication, though again only marginally significant, that states with mandates, and states using either discretionary or flat grant funding allocated aid more regressively, or at least less progressively. While the mandate effect was somewhat surprising, the effects of discretionary and flat grants were as expected. Again, we caution that these findings are extremely tentative, if not completely spurious.
Figure 3 displays what these findings might mean, were they more robust. The mean response (solid line), or average relationship between aid allocations and percentages of children in poverty across all states, was a relatively strong, progressive distribution of aid (positive slope 0.63). In states with mandates, compared to the average response, aid was higher in districts with fewer students in poverty, but not in districts with more students in poverty, creating a more neutral distribution (less positive slope, 0.63 " 0.42 = 0.21). Note that aid in states with mandates was $31 higher per pupil than in states without mandates, 49 for the district with the average number of children in poverty (17.68%). In states using discretionary grants, aid distributions were flat (slight negative slope, 0.63 " 0.65 = "0.02), as might be expected and in states using flat grants, aid distributions were both relatively flat and relatively low (slight positive slope, 0.63 " 0.50 = 0.13 with an intercept of only 76 cents per pupil). Table 2 displays the estimates of the random effects logit and tobit models of program availability and participation rates. To no surprise, logit models of program availability suggest that schools in states with program mandates were 2.0 (model with all states) to 2.7 (model with 19 states) times as likely to offer gifted programs. Schools in states providing funding were 2.2 times as likely to offer gifted programs. Among states providing funding, and those where the level of funding could reliably be estimated (n = 19), the level of funding did not appear to influence program availability.
Regarding participation rates, schools in states with mandates tended to serve significantly higher percentages of their students in gifted programs. In addition, schools in states providing funding for gifted education also served significantly more students in gifted programs. Among states providing funding, and those where the level of funding could reliably be estimated, the level of funding was not associated with program participation rates. This finding may be a function of the relatively sparse and inconsistent gifted education state revenue data available in the CCD.
Interestingly, district-level financial variables were not significantly associated with program availability. However, districts with higher cost adjusted current expenditures per pupil and districts that were generally less dependent on state aid served higher percentages of their students in gifted programs in the tobit model using the complete available sample, though not in the tobit model including only those states where funding levels could be calculated. District level enrollments did not consistently influence availability or participation rates.
Some expected patterns emerged with respect to inter and intra district choice variables. For example, schools in districts with higher percentages students exiting were less likely to offer gifted programs and schools in districts with higher percentages of students entering served more students in gifted programs. In addition, schools in districts where larger percentages of students participating in magnet programs were less likely to offer gifted programs. The mixed models, however, suggest that schools in districts where larger percentages of children participate in intra district choice served more students in gifted programs. One might argue that this increased provision of services is a function of the need for schools within districts to compete with one another for gifted students by presenting an outward impression of strong services for gifted students. Among school-level covariates, school enrollments were significantly associated with both program availability and participation rates. As expected, larger schools were significantly more likely (4.2 to 4.7 times) to offer gifted programs. Contrary to expectations, larger schools served larger portions of their populations in gifted programs. Suburban and rural schools were more likely to offer gifted programs and suburban schools generally (though marginally, in the case of the "funding available" model) served larger percentages of their students in those programs. As expected, secondary and comprehensive schools were less likely than elementary schools to offer gifted programs and where they did, they served fewer pupils. Gifted programs are more likely to exist in elementary schools than secondary schools due to lack of other differentiated curricular opportunities, such as advanced level courses. Most comprehensive schools are likely to be very small in terms of numbers of students per grade level and either lack the critical mass to support special programs, or work under the assumption that their small class sizes allow them to meet individual students' needs more easily.
Finally, schools with higher percentages of low-income children were both less likely to offer gifted programs and served smaller percentages of 
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Mandates Discretionary Flat their student populations in those programs where they existed. Figure 4 presents a graphic depiction of the marginal effects of mandates and funding on the relationships between gifted program availability and percentages of children in poverty. Linear predicted values were generated from the logit model including the funding availability indicator, holding all other variables constant at their means. The funding availability model was used because it included all states and because the funding availability indicator was statistically significant. Note that slopes were not allowed to vary, as in the mixed models, and that all slopes were negative, indicating lower likelihood of gifted program availability in schools with higher percentages of children in poverty.
A school with 0% children in poverty in a state with both a mandate and funding was 80% more likely than average to offer a gifted program. A school with 100% children in poverty in a state with both a mandate and funding was still 23% more likely than average to offer a gifted program. In states with funding but no mandates, schools with 0% children in poverty were slightly more likely than average to offer gifted programs, but most schools in states with funding only, or mandates only were less likely than average to offer gifted programs. In states with neither mandates, Baker and Friedman-Nimz 54 nor funding, the likelihood that a school would offer a gifted program was well below average, even in schools with few children in poverty. Figure 5 presents a graphic depiction of the marginal effects of mandates and funding on the relationships between program participation rates and percentages of children in poverty based on the tobit model including the funding availability indicator, generated by holding all other variables constant at their means. As in Figure 4 , slopes were not allowed to vary across states. In states with both funding and mandates, schools with no children in poverty served 5.88% of their students in gifted programs, while schools with all children in poverty served 1.62%. Schools in states with either mandates or funding, but not both, served nearly identical portions of students with respect to poverty levels: 2.3% in schools with no children in poverty, and no students in schools with poverty rates above 60%. One implication is that a complete mandate/funding package is worth more than the sum of its parts (5.88 > 2.3 + 2.3 at 0% poverty), at least in terms of percentages of children served.
The linear mixed models presented in Table 3 provided minimal support for our hypotheses regarding the distribution of program participation rates with respect to state policies and school level income status. First, direct effects of state policies were non-significant in both models. Second, the percent of low-income students in schools was only significant in the expected direction in the "funding level" model including the reduced sample. Covariance parameters in the "funding availability" model including the full sample did suggest that intercepts (the state average levels of participation) varied significantly from state to state and that the slopes (the within state relationships between percent low income and participation rates) varied, though marginally ( p < .10), across states. The statistically significant negative coefficient on the interaction between funding availability and percent low income suggests that participation rates tended to be more regressive in states providing funding.
An In-Depth Look at Two States: South Carolina & Virginia
To illuminate the more subtle details of state policies that may influence the distribution of opportunities, this section discusses the policies of two states with strikingly different aid allocation practices and opportunity distributions-South Carolina and Virginia. Reviewing aid allocation practices, in 1993-94 South Carolina allocated $36.93 per pupil for gifted education, possessed a statistically significant positive relationship between aid allocation and median family income and statistically significant negative relationship 56 between aid allocation and state aid dependence. That is, South Carolina allocated systematically more aid for gifted education to higher income districts that were less dependent on state support. Virginia allocated somewhat less aid per pupil at $17.27, but unlike South Carolina, Virginia systematically allocated more aid to lower income districts with lower core expenditures per pupil that were generally more dependent on state aid (Table 4) .
Reviewing opportunity distributions, Virginia had a 10% higher rate of schools offering gifted and talented programs. Neither state possessed a statistically significant difference in the percent of students qualifying for National School Lunch programs between schools with and without gifted programs. However, South Carolina possessed a significant negative correlation between the percent of students qualifying for free lunch programs and participation rates in gifted programs. That is, in South Carolina, more students participate in gifted programs in schools with fewer lowincome students.
Regarding policies, both states possessed mandates for identification of and programming for gifted students, though Virginia's mandate was via departmental regulation and South Carolina's via legislation. South Carolina's mandate indicates that "Gifted and Talented students at the elementary and secondary levels must be provided programs during the regular school year or during summer school to develop their unique talents in the manner specified by the State Board of Education" and further that "Gifted and Talented students are those who are identified in Grades 3-12 as demonstrating high performance ability or potential in academic or artistic areas and therefore require services or programs not ordinarily provided by the regular school program." 19 In general, it would appear that South Carolina's policy adopts local norms for assessing student needs, which one would expect to lead to a relatively neutral distribution of participation rates across districts. This, however, was not the case.
One possible contributor to the lack of neutrality between participation rates and district income status was that South Carolina systematically allocated more aid to higher income, less state aid dependent districts. South Carolina allocated its aid for gifted education at a flat rate per pupil based on local reports of participating students, creating a reinforcing feedback between identification and funding. Note that many states with identification-based funding systems, but not South Carolina, applied limits to identification rates. Though South Carolina's state financial commitment was relatively high, it is still reasonable to assume that state aid did not meet full costs of providing services. As such, identifying and serving additional students, and accessing state aid may have been most worthwhile for districts 57 with the capacity to supplement that aid with local resources, creating the aid allocation pattern observed in Table 4 . Curley (1991) raised similar concerns by regarding New York's flat grant policy and by Baker (2001c) regarding Texas' pupil weight policy.
This finding, however, begs the question of how districts with lower fiscal capacity avoided identifying and serving gifted students in a state with a program mandate. Arguably there is likely to be reduced political pressure in lower income communities to provide gifted programs. A closer read of South Carolina's mandate, however, reveals that the state explicitly exempted low fiscal capacity districts from its mandate. South Carolina's mandate noted: "Where funds are insufficient to serve all students, the district may determine which children shall be served." 20 Similar to South Carolina, Virginia possessed a relatively flexible mandate for identification and services for gifted children, based primarily on local norms: "Gifted Students means those students in public elementary and secondary school beginning with kindergarten through graduation whose abilities and potential for accomplishment are so outstanding that they require special programs to meet their educational needs. These students will be identified by professionally qualified persons through the use of multiple criteria as having potential or demonstrated abilities and who Note. NS = Non-significant, All others significant at p < .05.
have evidence of high performance capabilities, which may include leadership in (1) intellectual aptitude, (2) specific academic aptitude, (3) technical and practical arts aptitude or (4) visual or performing arts aptitude." (abbreviated). 21 As previously noted, Virginia's aid allocation practices were strikingly different from those of South Carolina in that Virginia allocated substantially more aid to lower income, lower core expenditure, more state aid dependent districts. Though Virginia's average aid level per pupil was substantially less than South Carolina's, one might expect the equalized pattern of aid distribution to assist lower fiscal capacity local districts to provide services, playing some role in neutralizing identification rates with respect to district income. Rather than funding gifted education on a flat per-identified-pupil basis, Virginia provided local fiscal capacity equalized aid toward the purchase of one gifted education specialist per thousand students. As a result, Virginia avoided the reinforcing feedback of identification and funding experienced in South Carolina's higher income districts. More importantly however, the equalized aid insured that lower income districts had at least some personnel available to carry out the state's mandate. Note also that the mandate itself was written to recognize the presence and role of trained personnel.
Policy Recommendations
While simultaneously modeling within and between state relationships is a complex statistical task, the analyses herein may inform the development of more practical state level indicators for guiding policy development. Our recommendations address the measurement of equity and rationality of opportunities, 22 as the measurement of the "adequacy" of opportunities requires for more extensive discussion than we are able to provide herein.
23
While this article focuses on the distribution of opportunities for gifted children, we wish to provide a generalizable framework and set of indicators for evaluating opportunity distributions. We define equity/neutrality and rationality as follows:
• Equity/Neutrality: Either uniform distribution, or lack of a systematic relationship between local fiscal capacity and community socioeconomic measures and availability and comprehensiveness of opportunities.
Baker and Friedman-Nimz
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• Rationality: Strong, systematic relationship across districts between the availability and comprehensiveness of opportunities and the prevalence of student need for those opportunities.
Opportunity measures include, but are not limited to (a) the availability of a specific program or opportunity, (b) the participation rates in a specific program or opportunity, (c) the staffing resources allocated to a specific program or opportunity or (d) the fiscal resources allocated to a specific program or opportunity.
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Some opportunities, like programs for limited English proficient children are based on specific educational needs which may not vary randomly across districts. That is, need may be higher in districts with lower average SES or fiscal capacity, or vice versa. Other opportunities, like programs in visual and performing arts, for example, may be similarly good for all children (though community interest in these opportunities may have socioeconomic correlates). Where educational need is the primary basis for providing and opportunity, and where prevalence of need can be known, rationality becomes the dominant concern.
It is critically important to understand that actual prevalence of need may differ substantially from needs identified by local school districts, because locally identified need may be a function of both local capacity to meet needs and state policies governing those needs. For example, districts are likely to identify more children as gifted and talented, regardless of need, when state funding is available. As such, direct exogenous measures, or indirect, exogenous predictors of true prevalence are required for evaluating rationality. Disentangling actual need from endogenous, locally identified need is an issue increasingly being addressed by researchers in special education finance (Parrish, Gerber, Kaleba, & Brock, 2000; Parrish, Kaleba, Gerber, & McLaughlin, 1998) . Among the most straight forward exogenous measures of need are U.S. Census measures of the "percent of children ages 5-17 who speak English 'Not Well' " for measuring need for bilingual education, or other language remediation programs across districts.
The equity or rationality of gifted education opportunity distributions depends on whether giftedness is defined by state policy in terms of local norms, or state or national norms or criteria. Where local norms are emphasized, true prevalence dif-ferences across districts cannot be known, and only equity/neutrality measures may be calculated, such as the correlation between opportunities and socioeconomic and local fiscal capacity measures.
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Where state criteria or norms are imposed, the state must gather data (e.g., percent of children scoring in top 5% of state assessments) on students who meet those criteria and use those data to indicate prevalence. Then, rationality concerns may override equity concerns. If more students score in the top 5% of state assessments attend higher income, or higher capacity districts, it may be reasonable that those districts provide more comprehensive programming for gifted children and receive more aid to do so. Other opportunities that a legislature may deem important, like music and/or visual arts, where prevalence of need cannot be known or is irrelevant, should always be evaluated in terms of equity/neutrality standards.
Conclusions
Analyses herein suggest that program mandates and funding may be effective tools for increasing the distribution of opportunities for gifted children. This rather obvious finding is likely to be of limited use to state policy makers. However, models of both aid distribution and opportunity distribution indicate an overall tendency of states more significantly involved in gifted education, as indicated by mandates and funding, to promote regressive distributions of opportunities through regressive distributions of aid. More specific case analyses, however, reveal that some states like
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Virginia may be taking steps to promote more neutral distributions of opportunities through more progressive allocations of state aid.
State legislators are annually faced with difficult questions such as whether a mandate is the best approach to ensuring quality programs for specific populations, or how to best allocate state funds to local districts to guarantee proper, efficient use and distribution of those funds. Unfortunately, far too little empirical evidence exists on the effectiveness of policy designs toward achieving important policy objectives like vertical equity, leaving policy makers few options but to revert to exploring the untested policies of neighboring states. In particular, when it comes to meeting the needs of fringe 26 populations like gifted and talented children, policymakers must often choose between the risk of replicating dysfunctional policies or having no policy at all.
This study attempts to partially fill the information void on the effects of state policies on opportunities by analyzing the effects of state gifted education policies on the distribution of opportunities for gifted children. More importantly, perhaps, this study provides a conceptual framework and statistical methodology for analyzing distributions of and relationships between supplemental state aid programs and educational opportunities. This framework and methodology may be applied to other programming areas including bilingual education or special education to yield similarly informative findings for state policy makers. 
Notes
1 Federal legislation regarding gender equity and students with disabilities notwithstanding.
2 See Guthrie and Rothstein (1999) for a more thorough description of this "professional judgment" based approach.
3 For a discussion of the implications of this research regarding the marginal costs of educating gifted children, See Baker (2001b) . For a more thorough discussion of the relationship between educational adequacy and vertical equity, see Underwood (1995) . 4 The marginal costs in this context are the costs above and beyond the average costs of providing a basic education.
5 Where predicted need is based on U.S. Census 1990 characteristics of districts including percentages of children between the ages of 5 and 17 living in poverty for estimating numbers of at risk children and percentages of children who speak English "Not Well" for estimat-61 ing numbers of limited English proficient children. Baker assumes that local school and district reports of at risk and limited English proficient children are endogenous, and influenced by the potential to receive state aid. Unfortunately, no good exogenous measure for predicting the prevalence of giftedness was available. This concept is further discussed at a later point in this article.
6 See Baker (1995) . 7 Updated reviews of state policies for gifted education show few substantive changes. See Baker and McIntire (2002 Chambers (1999) . Note that this adjustment accommodates only the differences in prices a district may have to pay to purchase comparable resources, where the primary resources in question are specialized staff for gifted education. Chamber's cost index does not address, for example, the differences in resource intensity (numbers of staff per pupil and/or different qualifications of staff) that might be required in different settings in order to achieve comparable outcomes. For example, one might argue that gifted, at risk children in a poor urban setting require more highly trained specialists, and more individual contact with specialists to experience similar benefits. There is also some indication, based on unpublished analyses performed by this author and other recent teacher labor market research, that Chamber's cost of education index fails to adequately adjust for harsh working conditions. That is, the index underestimates the price that a poor urban district might have to pay to attract and retain the same teacher (of similar qualifications) as a wealthy suburban district. In the context of this study, the summed total effects of these shortcomings is that the value of gifted education revenues in poor urban districts in particular is likely to be overstated.
11 Where within state means were calculated as pupilweighted means.
12 For a similar application of SAS PROC MIXED, see Singer (1998) pp. 333-336. 13 Based on school level reports of children qualifying for the National School Lunch program.
14 In this case, the fact that the cost adjustments used (Chambers' GCEI) account only for variations in input/ resource prices and not resource intensity may be more problematic than application of the GCEI to aid for gifted education. Either a small rural district or a large poor urban district might appear to have relatively high expenditure levels, giving the appearance that the district has increased flexibility to offer "discretionary" programs. If one were to be able to effectively adjust for differences in required resource intensity toward producing comparable outcomes/benefits for students, the value of those expenditure levels would be substantially reduced. For example, a small, sparse rural district may have relatively high expenditure levels, while paying only average (or slightly above average) prices for resources. The high expenditures in small, sparse rural districts are primarily a function of required staffing per pupil levels, higher fixed cost ratios and additional transBaker and Friedman-Nimz 62 portation costs. That is, these districts lack economies of scale. Our inclusion of a district enrollment covariate should moderate, to some extent, the problem of expenditure differences due to economies of scale.
